C onsider the following situation.
The presidents of two chain restaurants are concerned
The question we pose for the reader is, Which president about their potential liability due to sexual-harassment chose wisely regarding whether to settle their lawsuit? The suits. Both presidents therefore ensure that their combest answer that we can propose is, neither one. According to panies develop and enforce well-drafted policies against current law, both presidents chose poorly, as we explain in sexual harassment. The second president, hoping to this article. While the company that dismissed the manager provide even further protection for his organization, also based on the toll-free call may prevail, there remains a good provides sexual-harassment training for its managers chance that it will lose in court. On the other hand, the comand a toll-free number that allows employees to report pany that provided no training and no toll-free number is harassment 24 hours per day.
almost assured of victory.
Unfortunately, despite corporate policy, a night manager at each chain is engaged in sexually harassing behavior. Although the two employees affected by this behavior become quite upset, they initially fear reporting it. After some time, the employee at the second chain remembers the option of reporting the harassment through the toll-free number and calls to complain about the manager's behavior. The person who receives the call promises to investigate, and, indeed, the company does investigate and subsequently fires the manager. Three months later, the employees at both companies, both of whom have by this time quit their jobs, file charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
The president of the second chain restaurant refuses a reasonable settlement offer because he is confident that the company's training and toll-free reporting line, along 0 2001, CORNELL UNIVERSITY with the fact that his firm fired the harasser, will absolve the company of liability. The president of the first company, on the other hand, is concerned that her firm did not have a toll-free hotline, that it did not train its employees well, and, moreover, that the harasser still works for the company. Company One decides to settle at any cost.
The idea that an employer could protect itself from sexualharassment liability byfailing to provide a sexual-harassment hot line or train employees is contrary to the intent of the law, and that is the "perversity" of sexual-harassment law to which we allude in the title of this article. ' 524 U. S. 742, 118 S. Ct. 2257 S. 742, 118 S. Ct. (1998 .
3 This article is based on: David Sh erwyn, Michael H&e, and Zev J. Eigen, "Don't Train Your Employees and Cancel Your 'l-800' Harassment Hotline: An Empirical Examination and Correction of the Flaws in the Affirmative Drfense to Sexual Harassment," Fordham Law Review, Vol. LXIX, Number 4 (2001 ), pp. 1265 -1304 and practice that successfully protected organizations from sexual-harassment liability in court cases. Before delving into a number of those 109 cases, however, we first provide some background established by prior sexual-harassment holdings.
Sexual-harassment Rulings
A detailed discussion of the history and development of sexual-harassment in the workplace exceeds this article's scope. It is important to note, however, that no federal statute expressly prohibits or even addresses sexual harassment in the workplace. Moreover, scholars generally agree that when enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (under which most sexualharassment cases are brought), Congress did not contemplate that the statute's prohibition against discrimination based on sex would create a cause of action for employees who were subjected to unwanted sexual advances without suffering any tangible loss.* In fact, the origins of the legal prohibition against sexual harassment are generally attributed to Catherine MacKinnon.
MacKinnon coined the term sexual harassment and built the foundation of a cause of action in 1979, when she published the book Sexual Harassment of Working Women. 5 MacKinnon defined sexual harassment in its broadest sense as the "unwanted imposition of sexual requirements in the context of a relationship of unequal power."6 The influence of her work on both courts and scholars was swift and profound.' 4 For example, see: Gillian Had&Id, "Rational Women: ATest for Sex-based Harassment," 83 California Law Rev, 1151 , 1166 (1995 Review, 55 (1999) at 64, who commented: "Of course, courts will likely require more than the mere existence of a well drafted and effectively promulgated written policy to support a finding that an employer exercised reasonable care to prevent sexually harassing behavior. Employers should regularly conduct training to educate employees about harassment and company policies. Training of supervisors is particularly important given the Supreme Court's clear mandate that employers may be held vicariously liable for the conduct of supervisors. To ensure that the employer derives maximum benefit from these efforts, records should be kept that make clear who has received training and when." See also: DiLorenzo and Harshbarger, pp. 19-20, who wrote: "The recent rulings suggest that training rank and file employees in the use of the complaint procedure may be as critical as training supervisors to refrain from engaging in harassing conduct or properly responding to complaints or other notice of inappropriate
conduct. An employer invoking the affirmative defense must be prepared to show that it acted reasonably to prevent and correct harassment and that the plaintiff failed to act reasonably to prevent, correct, or otherwise avoid the harassing conduct. An employer who demonstrates that all employees were made aware that the employer had a policy and were also fully informed as to the procedure for reporting harassment is far more likely to successfully demonstrate its own reasonableness in preventing or correcting harassing behavior. Moreover, an employer who actively trains all employees in the use of the policy, and thereby educates its employees in the importance of their role in preventing or correcting the prohibited behavior will undoubtedly have a persuasive argument that an employee's failure to invoke the reporting procedure was unreasonable, and, therefore, establish its affirmative burden."
" See: Theresa M. Beiner, "The Misuse ofsummary Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases," 34 Wake Forest Law Review, 71, 73 n. 10 (1999) , which argues that federal courts are misusing summary judgment in hostile-environment cases brought under Title VII; and Anne Lawton, "The Emperor's New Clothes: How the Academy Deals with Sexual Harassment," 11 Yale JournalofLaw &Fmzinism, 75 (1999) , which predicts that leaving the determination of reasonable behavior on the parts of both employers and employees to the lower courts will make it more difficult for employers to win on summaryjudgment motions.
based on two separate theories. First, some scholars argue that a court will let a jury decide whether it is reasonable for an employee to fail to report sexual harassment because of the employee's fear of repercussions." Second, others argue that employees cannot only avoid summary judgment, but can defeat the defense and make the employer liable if they report the alleged harassment." Indeed, Justice ClarenceThomas's dissent in Ellerth advances the latter proposition. Justice Thomas reads the majority's opinions as holding that an employee who reports sexual harassment cannot, as a matter of law, be found to have unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid harm." Thus, according to Justice Thomas, an employer is liable for sexual harassment if and when the employee reports (assuming the complaint is genuine).2' Glenn George, on the other hand, argues that an employee's Title VII claim will fail if the employer deals promptly and effectively with a victim's complaint. (1) employers would not prevail in summaryjudgment motions; (2) employees who reported would always prevail; (3) employees who did not report would survive summary judgment; and (4) employers would have to do much more than have a sexual-harassment policy to exercise reasonable care. 24 We found that employers are still able to prevail in summary-judgment motions by using the affirmative defense.
Now that enough time has passed, we can analyze a group of decisions and explore how courts have applied the affirmative defense. This article analyzes the outcome of 109 motions for summary judgment filed since June 1998, in which employers argued that a hostile-environment case should be dismissed because the employer satisfied, as a matter of law, the affirmative defense.25 We focus on how courts have analyzed the "reasonable" standard in both prongs. The examination of these cases provides the opportunity to test past conjecture and describe how courts have implemented the Ellertb and Faragber rulings.
No Foregone Conclusions Despite what seems to be a rejection of Ellertb and Faragber, the Zndest court states that it relied on the principles of these two cases along with the Meritor decision to formulate its holding. The court explained that when a plaintiff promptly complains, both the employee and the employer could thwart harassment before it becomes actionable. This result, according to the court, effectuates the purposes of Title VII because the employee receives the benefit of having the harassment stopped and the employer is rewarded for its swift response. Moreover, this standard comports with Meritor, which held that the affirmative defense. Thus, in the Fifth Circuit at least, an employer who exercises reasonable care in responding to a complaint of sexual harassment will be able to prevail on the afflrmative defense and avoid liability even if the conduct was severe or pervasive. Evidently, the court in Zndest did not want to find against the "good actor" employer, and so it distinguished the case from Ellertb and Faragber.
At least one court may have followed the Zndest standard. In Hammonds v. Fitzgerald? Mississippi, the plaintiff was subjected to unwanted sexual advances by her supervisor but failed to report or use any of the remedies provided by the defendant employer's sexualharassment policy. 39 Nine months later the same supervisor raped her, and she reported that incident three weeks later. After the plaintiff reported the rape, the defendant thoroughly investigated the incident and the harasser resigned under threat of termination. In granting the defendant's summary-judgment motion, the court set forth two different rationales that could form the basis for the holding: (1) the employer's response and (2) the fact that the employee did not report the conduct that preceded the rape.
37 Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 E3d 258 (5th Cir. 1999 ) at 265, which notes that, "Ellerth and Faragher do nor, however, directly speak m the circumstances before us, a case in which the plainriff quickly resorted to Freeman's policy and grievance procedure against sexual harassment, and the employer took prompt remedial action."
The court did not, however, state which rationale was dispositive.
If it relied on the employer's response, then the court applied the rationale set forth in Indest. While this may be problematic to some, it is not nearly as objectionable as relying on the employee's "late" report. As we discuss below, judging the report is an unacceptable method for operationalizing the defense. Unfortunately, the majority of courts found the delay unreasonable and granted sumthat were faced with instances in which a super-mary judgment.45 visor harassed an employee, the employee comOther complications. Delay is not the only plained, and the company responded properly rationale that courts use for finding employees have, in fact, taken what we consider to be an who report harassment to be unreasonable. Sevundesirable approach of holding for the employer eral decisions held that reporting to the wrong by analyzing the employee's report and finding party constitutes an unreasonable failure to take it unreasonable because it was untimely or somehow defective. 40 We discuss below a number of those cases and explain why this is an undesirable approach.
When a plaintiff promptly complains, both the employee and the employer may be able to thwart harassment before it becomes actionable. In those cases, the employee receives the benefit of having the harassment stopped and the employer is rewarded for its swift response.
In 12 cases from our sample, a plaintiff was found to be unreasonable because she delayed in reporting the harassment.4' In some cases there was a delay of one year or more between the first harassing action and the report. 42 In other cases, however, the delay was a matter of months or even weeks. For example, in Nuris Guerra v. Editorial Teevisa, the plaintiff, who began working on May 26, 1996, was harassed every day from either her first or second week of work until she complained on June 20, 1 996. 43 In dismissing the case, the court held that the delay combined with the employer's prompt and proper response satisfied the second prong of the defense. Similarly, in Mirakborli v. DFWManagement Company, it was unclear whether the harassment began two or eight months before the plaintiff complained. 44 The court was unconcerned with the discrepancy, though, because it found a delay of either two or eight months unreasonable as a matter of law. Finally, in Dedner v. State of Oklahoma the plaintiff waited three months to report the harassment because she did not think the employer's procedures would be effective and because she thought the supervisor would not stop the harassing behavior. Again, the court advantage of the employer's policies and procedures. In Decesare v. Nat7 R.R. Passenger Corp., the plaintiff complained by filing a grievance with her union instead of using the company's procedures. 
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On the other hand, when an employee makes a timely report of sexual harassment, the employer could be held liable even though it's done all that it could do to prevent such harassment. should exercise minimal care and hope the em-Faragber applies the two-prong affirmative deployee does not report-or so it seems. fense in a situation where the employee reported, The high-hopes defense. The questions re-we see no reason for lower courts to be bound by maining after our analysis are derived from the those decisions in such circumstances. Accordlast factor, which involves the hope that employingly, lower courts are free to apply a standard ees won't report harassment. First, should your that best effectuates the purposes ofTitle VII and company do less than all it can do to prevent harassment because so doing will result in a better defense? This is both a humanresources and an ethical issue. Second, is avoiding liability the best method for reducing the cost of sexual-harassment lawsuits? If, for instance, training and harassment hotlines reduce the number of lawsuits filed, employers who encourage reporting harassment may be able to stay out of court altogether by resolving matters well before a lawsuit is filed. Such scenarios, which remain private and beyond our scrutiny, may lead one to conclude that a full-fledged war on harassment is the best way to reduce costs even if it does result in the potential for an adverse jury verdict. Further research is needed to see whether this hypothesis is true.
Our study produces an argument that may absolve an employer from liability when the employer exercises reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment even in those cases where the employee does not unreasonably fail to report.
other discrimination laws as set forth in the ELLerth and Faragher opinions. Because both the ELLertb and Faragber holdings contend that Title VII is supposed to encourage compliance, it makes sense to conclude that the Supreme Court would never have enacted a defense that discourages employers from enacting policies and procedures that would encourage reporting and thus help eliminate harassment.
Our study produces an argument that may absolve an employer from liability when the employer exercises reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment and the employee does not unreasonably fail to report. We contend that in cases in which the employee reports harassment, ELLerth and Faragber do not apply. Instead, we suggest a new standard for such situations, that simply being the first prong of the defense, namely, to establish whether the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct harassment. Below, we explain how employers can present this argument to courts in such cases.
Proper actions. AS the Indest court noted, in both Ellerth and Faragher the employees did not report the harassment to their employers before they quit their jobs. 5o Moreover, neither opinion directly addresses or even alludes to the applicability of the defense when the employee does in fact report. 5' Thus, because neither ELLerth nor At first glance, distinguishing a case in which an employee reports harassment from the ELLertb and Faragber cases might resemble hair-splitting. However, when one considers the legal consequences that result from either applying or not applying the two-prong defense to cases in which employees do file a report, it is clear that the Supreme Court's holdings in ELLertb and Faragber were meant to apply only in cases in which the employee did not file a report.
Applying the affirmative defense to cases in which the plaintiff reports the harassment cre- ates a perverse incentive for employers to expend only a limited amount of effort to combat sexual harassment. This contradicts the Supreme Court's own conclusion that Title VII seeks to encourage employers to comply with and enact policies
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